Boris Yeltsin and the Question of Democratic Commitment: Testing Clinton’s Assumptions
On April 1, 1992, Bill Clinton, then Governor of Arkansas and a U.S. presidential candidate, delivered a foreign policy speech that outlined his vision for American leadership in the post-Cold War era. Central to his agenda was the promotion of democracy worldwide, with a particular emphasis on supporting Russia’s transition under President Boris Yeltsin. Clinton argued that the United States must actively foster a stable, democratic global order, drawing parallels to the post-World War II leadership of Harry Truman and George Marshall. He criticized the George H.W. Bush administration’s cautious approach to aiding Russia, advocating for robust financial and technical support to bolster Yeltsin’s economic reforms, such as price liberalization and privatization. Clinton viewed these reforms as essential to preventing Russia’s economic collapse and the rise of aggressive nationalism, positioning Yeltsin as a steadfast partner in building a Western-style liberal democracy.
Clinton’s speech revealed several assumptions about Russia and Yeltsin. He presumed that American-led assistance would ensure Russia’s transformation into a liberal democracy, that Western democratic values were universally exportable, and that a democratic Russia would naturally align with U.S. interests. Regarding Yeltsin, Clinton assumed he was fully committed to sustaining democratic reforms, prioritizing freedom, and establishing a constitutional democracy capable of steering Russia away from authoritarianism or nationalism. These assumptions, however, rested on an optimistic view of Yeltsin’s intentions and Russia’s political trajectory, potentially overlooking historical and cultural complexities. This article examines the veracity of Clinton’s assumptions by analyzing Yeltsin’s life, political evolution, and actions from his early years through the Soviet Union’s collapse in 1991.
Yeltsin’s Early Life: Defiance Without Democratic Ideals
Born in 1931 in the Ural Mountains, Boris Yeltsin grew up in a rural peasant family scarred by Stalin’s collectivization policies. His grandparents, independent kulaks, lost their property during the Bolshevik Revolution, and his family faced further hardship under Stalin’s forced collectivization, which led to famine and exile. Yeltsin’s father, Nikolai, was briefly jailed, and the family fled nearly 500 miles to seek construction work. These experiences shaped Yeltsin’s defiance, evident in his childhood—he was expelled from school for disrupting a ceremony and lost two fingers at age eleven after hitting a grenade with a hammer. However, this defiance did not translate into an early embrace of democratic ideals. Yeltsin’s reactions mirrored Soviet political stages: he avoided political engagement under Stalin and Khrushchev, focusing on practical survival rather than ideological opposition to authoritarianism.
Yeltsin’s education at the Ural Polytechnic Institute and his career in civil engineering reflected pragmatic ambition. Unlike his rival Mikhail Gorbachev, who engaged early with the Communist Youth League (Komsomol) and the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU), Yeltsin avoided political involvement, joining the CPSU in 1961 at age thirty, a pragmatic move for career advancement. His rapid rise in the Soviet construction industry, marked by feats like completing an apartment complex in five days, showcased his work ethic but not a commitment to democratic principles. His leadership as first secretary of the Sverdlovsk regional party committee in 1976 showed efficiency and local focus, but his demolition of Ipat’ev House in 1977, following Politburo orders, underscored his loyalty to the Soviet system at the time.
Political Ascent and Populist Rhetoric
Yeltsin’s worldview began to shift in the late 1970s, influenced by dissident literature like Solzhenitsyn’s The Gulag Archipelago and a trip to France. Yet, his concerns remained “bread-and-butter” issues, driven by a sense of the Soviet system’s declining effectiveness rather than a commitment to democracy or markets. His move to Moscow in 1985, summoned by Gorbachev to lead the CPSU’s construction department, marked his entry into national politics. Appointed First Secretary of the Moscow City Committee by late 1985, Yeltsin leveraged Gorbachev’s glasnost policies to criticize CPSU elite privileges, using public transportation to connect with citizens and exposing bureaucratic excesses to the press. This populist rhetoric resonated widely but aligned more with democratic socialism than Western liberal democracy.
Yeltsin’s frustrations with Gorbachev’s slow perestroika reforms led to a dramatic break. In 1987, he resigned from the Politburo, criticizing Gorbachev and Yegor Ligachev for stalling reforms. His October 1987 Central Committee speech warned of waning public faith in the CPSU and called for “democratic forms,” but these demands were vague, driven by frustration rather than a clear democratic vision. Removed from the Politburo in 1988, Yeltsin languished in a minor role but capitalized on Gorbachev’s electoral reforms to revive his career. Running as an anti-elite candidate in the 1989 Congress of People’s Deputies of the Soviet Union (CPDSU) election, Yeltsin won nearly 90% of the vote in Moscow, exposing CPSU hypocrisy and gaining grassroots support.
His leadership in the Interregional Deputies Group (MDG), a democratic caucus within the CPDSU, introduced Yeltsin to democratic rhetoric, but his ambition and prior criticism of figures like Andrei Sakharov suggested opportunism. Yeltsin’s worldview remained pragmatic, focused on systemic decay rather than ideological reform. His 1989 U.S. tour, including a visit to a Houston supermarket, dismantled his Bolshevik worldview, highlighting Soviet scarcity against Western abundance. By 1990, Yeltsin identified with social democracy, joining the Democratic Platform to reform the CPSU, but this shift was driven by practical recognition of Soviet failures, not a deep commitment to liberal democracy.
The 1990 Election and Russian Sovereignty
The 1990 election to the Congress of People’s Deputies of the Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic (CPD) marked a turning point. Yeltsin campaigned on Russian sovereignty, arguing that the RSFSR suffered under the Soviet Union’s centralized structure. His strategy tapped into Russian resentment of other republics’ perceived ingratitude, advocating for decentralization while supporting a diminished Soviet Union. Elected speaker of the CPD in May 1990, Yeltsin became Russia’s de facto president. On June 12, 1990, the CPD declared Russian sovereignty, and Yeltsin resigned from the CPSU, signaling a break from Soviet orthodoxy.
In 1991, Yeltsin pushed for a directly elected Russian presidency, a move Gorbachev opposed. Winning the June 12, 1991, election with a popular mandate, Yeltsin defeated Soviet loyalist Nikolai Ryzhkov and ultra-nationalist Vladimir Zhirinovsky. His stand during the August 1991 putsch, denouncing the coup from atop a tank and rallying mass protests, cemented his image as a defender of emerging democratic institutions. The coup’s collapse, followed by Yeltsin’s decree banning the CPSU in Russia, marked a decisive blow to Soviet authoritarianism, aligning with Clinton’s view of Yeltsin as a democratic champion.
Post-Coup Consolidation and Democratic Doubts
Yeltsin’s actions post-coup raise questions about Clinton’s assumptions. The consolidation of power through decrees, like banning the CPSU, prioritized personal authority over democratic institution-building. Facing choices to call new elections, establish democratic institutions, or focus on market reforms while consolidating executive power, Yeltsin chose the latter. His “super presidency,” ruling by edict without a new constitution, reflected a fear of losing power, weakening democratic trends. Yeltsin’s reliance on personal loyalty and sidelining of democratic reformers undermined the notion of Russia as a democratic state, challenging Clinton’s optimistic assumptions.
Yeltsin’s democratic commitment emerged from strategic maneuvering rather than ideological conviction. His 1987 demotion by Gorbachev positioned him as a populist critic, and his 1991 resistance to the coup shifted power toward democratic forces. Yet, Yeltsin’s initial lack of focus on consolidating democratic institutions aligns with critiques of his pragmatic approach. His embrace of democracy, driven by opposition to the Soviet system rather than a deep commitment to liberal principles, casts doubt on Clinton’s belief in his steadfast dedication.
A Pragmatic Reformer, Not a Liberal Democrat
Yeltsin’s life and actions from his early years through 1991 provide mixed evidence for Clinton’s assumptions. His defiance and exposure to Western ideas suggested openness to change, but his focus remained practical, not ideological. His populist rhetoric and electoral successes leveraged public discontent, but his commitment to democratic socialism and Russian sovereignty often overshadowed liberal democratic ideals. The 1991 putsch highlighted his courage, yet his post-coup consolidation prioritized personal authority over institutional democracy. Clinton’s assumptions, rooted in the universal applicability of American democratic models, overlooked Russia’s historical lack of democratic traditions and Yeltsin’s pragmatic motivations, which shaped a political trajectory less aligned with Western liberal democracy than envisioned.
